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REGULATORY COMPETITION IN PARTNERSHIP LAW
MATHIAS M SIEMS*
Abstract Regulatory competition in company law has been extensively
debated in the last few decades, but it has rarely been discussed whether
there could also be regulatory competition in partnership law. This article
ﬁlls this gap. It addresses the partnership law of the US, the UK, Germany,
and France, and presents empirical data on the different types of partnerships
and companies established in these jurisdictions. The main focus is on the
use of a limited liability partnership (LLP) outside its country of origin. It is
also considered whether some regulatory competition can take place in the
law of limited partnerships.
I. INTRODUCTION
Regulatory competition in company law has been extensively debated in the
last few decades. It started in the US, where Delaware has managed to attract
almost half of the companies listed at the NYSE. In particular, American
academics have discussed whether the appeal of Delaware’s corporate law
presents a ‘race to the bottom’ or a ‘race to the top’.1 In the EU the 1998
decision of the European Court of Justice in Centros opened the door to
‘forum shopping’ in company law.2 Since this decision private companies
from continental Europe increasingly incorporate in the UK3 and the academic
literature has analysed the reasons and consequences of this development in
some detail.4
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Visiting Scholar at St John’s College, Oxford, to which I am indebted for its hospitality. I am
grateful to John Armour, Veronika Korom, Jennifer Payne and Simon Whittaker for helpful
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1 See, eg L A Bebchuk, A Cohen and A Ferrell, ‘Does the Evidence Favor State Competition
in Corporate Law?’ (2002) 90 California Law Review 1775; R Romano, The Genius of American
Corporate Law (AEI Press, Washington, 1993); see also III C 3 below.
2 For the case law of the ECJ see III C 1 a below.
3 See M Becht, C Mayer and H F Wagner, ‘Where Do Firms Incorporate?, Deregulation and
the Cost of Entry’ (2008) 14 Journal of Corporate Finance 241.
4 See eg J Armour, ‘Who Should Make Corporate Law? EC Legislation versus Regulatory
Competition’ (2005) 58 CLP 369; M Gelter, ‘The Structure of Regulatory Competition in
European Corporate Law’ (2005) 5 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 247; M Siems,
‘Convergence, Competition, Centros and Conﬂicts of Law: European Company Law in the 21st
Century’ (2002) 27 European Law Review 47.
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In contrast to this, the question whether there could also be regulatory
competition in partnership law in the EU has received little attention.5 This
article ﬁlls this gap. Since the discussion about regulatory competition in
company law started in the United States Part II analyses whether there is also
regulatory competition in US partnership law. Part III turns to the situation in
the European Union, and Part IV concludes. Both for the US and EU, the main
forms of partnership and the actual use of these forms are presented. That
forms of company may function as alternatives (‘vertical competition’) is also
addressed. Subsequently, both parts analyse whether partnerships can choose
the legal form of another (US/Member) State and how law-makers react (or
may react) to this development (‘horizontal competition’).
The main focus of this article is on the use of the limited liability partner-
ship (LLP) outside its country of origin. This situation is particularly inter-
esting because partnership law has usually been distinguished from company
law by the personal liability of the participants. To a lesser extent, whether
regulatory competition takes place in the law of limited partnerships will also
be discussed. There is some evidence that publicly held private partnerships
and private equity funds prefer certain jurisdictions. However, this is often not
a result of differences in partnership law but is driven by other legal and non-
legal factors.6
II. THE SITUATION IN THE US
In the US there are general partnerships, limited partnerships, limited liability
partnerships (LLPs) and, in some states, limited liability limited partnerships
(LLLPs). Furthermore, types of companies may be used instead of an LLP
or LLLP. In reality, some competition in partnership law can be observed,
although the development is less pronounced than in US corporate law.
A. Types of Partnerships
US partnership law is state law. However, most US states follow the two
model acts drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL), namely the Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1994
(RUPA) (as amended)7 and the (Revised) Uniform Limited Partnership Act of
1916 (ULPA) (as amended).8
5 There is some literature dealing with the speciﬁc question of whether the British LLP may
be used by German law ﬁrms; see eg M Siems, ‘Tschu¨ss Deutschland nun auch im
Personengesellschaftsrecht?—Deutsche und franzo¨sische Rechtsanwaltskanzleien als LLPs’
(2008) Zeitschrift fu¨r Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft 107 60–78; H Schnittker, Gesellschafts-
und steuerrechtliche Behandlung einer englischen Limited Liability Partnership mit
Verwaltungssitz in Deutschland (Schmidt, Ko¨ln, 2006).
6 See II C 3, III B 1 below.
7 List of state laws at http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-
upa9497.asp and http://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/vol7.html#partn.
8 List of state laws at http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-
ulpa.asp.
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At common law, partnerships were just considered aggregates of the
individual partners.9 According to RUPA, however, entities distinct from their
partners; therefore they may conduct business, acquire, hold, and dispose of
property, and sue and be sued in their own name.10 In this respect partnerships
are similar to companies, but their taxation is different. Whereas companies
are taxed at corporate and at shareholder level (‘double taxation’), a partner-
ship is a ‘ﬂow-through’ entity, which means that there is a single level of
taxation at the level of the partners.11
The relationship among partners is primarily governed by the partnership
agreement, whereas the applicable partnership act only provides default rules.
The main distinctions between the different types of partnerships concern
the liability of the partners. The general partnership can be created without
formalities for any purpose. However, partners are vicariously liable for the
debts and obligations of the partnership, although the creditor ﬁrst has to
exhaust the partnerships assets.12
A limited partnership requires the ﬁling of a certiﬁcate with the competent
state authority.13 It must have at least one general and one limited partner. The
general partners are fully liable for all obligations of the partnership, whereas
the limited partners are usually shielded from liability. Traditionally, the law
on limited partnerships required that the limited partners did not take any part
in the active management of the partnership. Gradually, however, the scope
of the activities that limited partners can undertake has been extended.14 In
particular this is the case in Delaware, where limited partners can be allowed
to vote on matters such as dissolutions, sales of assets, mergers, and admission
or removal of a general partner; furthermore they can consult with and advise
the general partner, and be a control person of the general partner.15
Limited liability partnerships (LLPs) go further. They were ﬁrst introduced
in Texas in 1991 because a number of business scandals made lawyers worry
about personal liability and lobby for more protection than under general
partnership law.16 In 1996 the RUPA was amended to include provisions on
the LLP, and by 2001 all ﬁfty states adopted some form of LLP.17 The
establishment of an LLP requires state ﬁling.18 Moreover, LLPs have to ﬁle an
annual report and pay annual fees.19
9 See J William Callison, ‘Federalism, Regulatory Competition, and the Limited Liability
Movement: The Coyote Howled and the Herd Stampeded’ (2001) 26 Journal of Corporation Law
951, 974. 10 RUPA s 201(a).
11 But see Internal Revenue Code · 7704 (exception for publicly traded limited partnerships).
12 RUPA ss 306, 307. 13 ULPA s 201.
14 LE Ribstein, ‘The Evolving Partnership’ (2001) 26 Journal of Corporation Law 819, 843.
15 Delaware Revised Uniform Partnership Act · 17–303.
16 On the history see eg RW Hamilton ‘Professional Partnerships in the United States’ (2001)
26 Journal of Corporation Law 1045,1056–1058.
17 See eg C G Bishop, ‘The Limited Liability Partnership Amendments to the Uniform
Partnership Act (1994)’ (1997) 53 Business Lawyer 101.
18 RUPA s 201(b). 19 RUPA s 1003(c).
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The law on LLPs varies in a number of instances between states. In some
states only professionals who are required to have licenses to do business are
allowed to form an LLP.20 Filing fees are ﬂat fees in some states and in others
they depend on the number of partners.21 In some states there are additional
safeguards for the protection of creditors. For instance, there may be an obli-
gation to provide a personal guarantee, to establish an escrow account or to
contract a special insurance for the LLP.22 Most importantly, there are dif-
ferences in the scope of liability protection. In one third of US states partners
are only protected for claims arising from torts committed by other partners
(eg claims arising in malpractice, malfeasance or other professional neg-
ligence). The remaining states have extended the scope of a partner’s liability
shield to other claims.23 This is also the approach of the amended version of
RUPA, which states that:
(a)n obligation of a partnership incurred while the partnership is a limited
liability partnership, whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise, is solely the
obligation of the partnership. A partner is not personally liable, directly or
indirectly, by way of contribution or otherwise, for such an obligation solely by
reason of being or so acting as a partner (. . .).24
However, even in these states the protection against liability is not unlimited.
Partners remain personally liable for their own negligent or wrongful acts and
that of persons under their direct supervision and control.25 There are also
further distinctions between states and between professions. In some states
partners are liable for tax and wage liabilities.26 And in some states certain
professions (such as lawyers) have to comply with additional conditions to
enjoy limited liability.27
Fifteen US states have also provided the possibility of transforming a
limited partnership into a limited liability limited partnership (LLLP).28 The
ULPA is indifferent about the availability of this new form of partnership.
However, for the states which provide the LLLP it is recommended that the
20 TE Rutledge, ‘To Boldly Go Where You Have Not Been Told You May Go: LLCs, LLPs,
and LLLPs in Interstate Transactions’ (2006) 58 Baylor Law Review 205, 227 (New York,
California, Nevada and Oregon).
21 See C R Goforth, ‘An Overview of Organizational and Ownership Options Available to
Agricultural Enterprises, Part I’, (National AgLaw Center Publications, 2002), available at http://
www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/articles/goforth_ownership1.pdf at 38.
22 Goforth ibid; M Hallweger, ‘Limited Liability Partnership—Eine Gesellschaftsform fu¨r
USAmerikanische Anwaltszusammenschlu¨sse und ihre Haftungsfragen Protection’ [1998] Neue
Zeitschrift fu¨r Gesellschaftsrecht (NZG) 531, 534.
23 See eg Ribstein (n 14) 838; T E Rutledge, ‘Limited Liability (or Not): Reﬂections on the
Holy Grail’ (2006) 51 South Dakota Law Review 417, 423–424.
24 RUPA 1996 s 306(c).
25 See eg Rutledge (n 23) 435–436, 447; Hallweger (n 22) 536.
26 See Rutledge (n 23) 443–444.
27 See R R Keatinge, ‘Are Professional Partnerships Really Partnerships? LLPs, LLCs and
PCs—Vicarious Liability Protections and Limitations’ 60 Consumer Finance Law Quarterly
Report 518; Rutledge (n 23) 447. 28 See Callison (n 9) 953.
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general partner’s liability shall be limited, similar to the liability of the
partner of an LLP.29 Thus, the LLLP keeps the distinction between general
and limited partners, although, in general, neither of them will be liable for the
obligations of the partnership.
B. Vertical Competition: Alternative Forms of Doing Business
In two important aspects S-Corporations, LLCs and PLLCs are similar to
LLPs. On the one hand, the shareholders/partners are usually not personally
liable. On the other hand, LLPs and these companies are not taxed at the entity
level, thus avoiding the double taxation of corporate tax law.
The S-Corporation was introduced in 1958. Its name derives from the fact
that it is taxed as a partnership according to Subchapter S of the Internal
Revenue Code. Inter alia, this requires that the company must not have more
than 100 shareholders and more than one class of stock.30 Moreover, general
state corporate law is applicable. This is different for the limited liability
company (LLC). In the mid 1970s the oil and gas company Hamilton Brothers
lobbied for a new and ﬂexible form of company, which can be managed either
by managers or the members themselves. It ﬁrst succeeded in Wyoming in
1977.31 By 1996 LLC statutes had been enacted in all US states, and in the
same year the NCCUSL also drafted a Uniform Limited Liability Company
Act (ULLCA).32 Moreover, in 1988 the Internal Revenue Service decided that
the LLC may be classiﬁed as a partnership for tax purposes.33 Usually, this
will be the case unless the LLC elects to be taxed as a corporation.
In general, the members of an LLC enjoy limited liability. Similar to the
provision in RUPA,34 the UCCLA states that:
[t]he debts, obligations, or other liabilities of a limited liability company,
whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise: (1) are solely the debts, obliga-
tions, or other liabilities of the company; and (2) do not become the debts,
obligations, or other liabilities of a member or manager solely by reason of the
member acting as a member or manager acting as a manager.35
Here too, however, this does not mean that the members of an LLC will escape
liability in all cases. In particular, they may remain liable for their own mis-
conduct.36 The ofﬁcial comments to the ULLCA mention the examples of a
personal guarantee, unauthorized agency and defamation.37
29 ULPA s 404(c). 30 For details see Internal Revenue Code s 1361.
31 On the history of the LLC see eg Hamilton (n 16) 1058–1060.
32 See also http://www.nccusl.org/update/uniformact_why/uniformacts_why-ullca.asp for the
2006 reform of the ULLCA.
33 Rev Proc 88-44, 1988-2 CB 634; Rev Rul 88-76, 1988-2 CB 360.
34 See II B above. 35 ULLCA s 304(a).
36 See eg S Saab Fortney, ‘Seeking Shelter in the Mineﬁeld of Unintended Consequences—
The Traps of Limited Liability Law Firms’ (1997) 54 Washington and Lee Law Review 717, 728.
37 See UCCLA s 304 (Comment).
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Professions such as lawyers, auditors, physicians, dentists and psychologists
had often not been allowed to establish a business corporation or a (simple)
LLC because corporations had not been regarded as being able to fulﬁl the
professional’s license requirements. To some extent, this was—and in some
states still is—addressed by the possibility of establishing a professional as-
sociation.38 Moreover, since the late 1960s more and more states have allowed
professionals to set up a professional corporation (PC). These PCs are usually
treated as ordinary companies. In some states some professions (such as
lawyers) remain, however, personally liable within deﬁned limits.39 More re-
cently, many US states have also provided the form of a professional limited
liability company (PLLC). The main difference is that a PC is usually a sep-
arate taxable entity, whereas the PLLC is taxed as a partnership.40
By and large, businesses and professionals can choose between general
partnerships, limited partnerships, LLPs, (P)LLCs, and (professional) cor-
porations. Exceptions are that in New York, California, Nevada and Oregon
only professionals have the right to establish an LLP and that in California
legal or accounting LLCs are inadmissible.41 Apart from these special cases, it
is fair to assume that some ‘vertical competition’42 between these different
types of partnership and company takes place. Table 1 presents data on the




















California 96,278 61,911 4,033 419 data n.a.
Delaware 33,449 97,508 9,901 114 139
Florida 157,310 123,055 1,543 492 Included in LP
Illinois 42,315 23,804 603 188 Included in LLP
New York 76,474 48,451 560 319 n.a.
Texas 36,473 58,288 16,355 5,310 n.a.
38 See Hamilton (n 16) 1048–1049.
39 See R W Hillman, ‘Organizational Choices of Professional Service Firms: An Empirical
Study’ (2003) 58 Business Lawyer 1387, 1392–1393.
40 See Rutledge (n 20) 217; Hamilton (n 16) 1051–52.
41 See Rutledge (n 20) 227.
42 For the distinction between vertical and horizontal competition see L E Ribstein, ‘The
Evolving Partnership’ (2001) 26 Journal of Corporation Law 819.
43 Source: International Association of Commercial Administrators (IACA), Annual Report
of the Jurisdictions, available at http://www.iaca.org/downloads/AnnualReports/2007_IACA_
AR.pdf. See also JC Dammann and M Schu¨ndeln, ‘Where are Limited Liability Companies
Formed? An Empirical Analysis’, University of Texas Law, Law and Economics Research Paper
No 126 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1126257. Note that in New York and Texas
the legal form of the LLP is not available.
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ﬁve most populated US states (California, Texas, New York, Florida, Illinois)
plus Delaware, which deserves special attention.
First, one can observe that in four out of six states the number of new
business and professional corporations is higher than the number of
new LLCs. Unfortunately, it is not disclosed how many corporations are
S-Corporations because only these corporations enjoy a comparable tax
treatment to LLCs. Secondly, it can be noted that there are considerably more
new companies than partnerships. In particular, there are between 11 (Texas)
and 250 (Florida) more new LLCs than LLPs. Thirdly, the limited partnership
is more popular than the LLP and LLLP in all states, although the latter types
of partnership provide a more extensive liability shield.
Focussing on law ﬁrms the picture changes. Hillman collected data on all
65,000 US law ﬁrms in 2002: 48 per cent of them are professional corpora-
tions or associations, 26 per cent are general partnerships, 10 per cent sole
proprietorships, 9 per cent LLPs and 7 per cent LLCs. The preference for
LLPs strengthens as ﬁrms grow in size.44 Similarly, Romley and Talley found
that larger ﬁrms are more likely to be transformed into LLPs or LLCs. This
was based on longitudinal data from 1993 to 1999, following the introduction
of the LLP and the extension of LLC laws to professional ﬁrms in many
states.45
There is also some general data available on how the different types of
companies and partnerships developed over time. Ribstein and Keatinge re-
port the development between 1996 and 2004: The number of LLCs increased
from 221,000 to 1,270,000 and the number of S-Corporations increased from
2,290,900 to 3,523,900 while the number of other corporations declined from
2,240,800 to 2,066,806.46 Hamilton provides information on the change
of newly established entities from 1999 to 2000 in Texas: the number of
new LLCs increased by 34 per cent and the number of new LLPs by 15 per
cent, whereas the number of new professional corporations decreased by
3 per cent.47
A number of reasons can be brought forward as to why a particular type of
company or partnership is chosen. LLPs and LLCs are similar in many re-
spects. For existing general or limited partnerships it may, however, be easier
to switch to an LLP than to an LLC. This concerns the initial choice as well as
the ongoing operations because the LLP allows ‘access [to] the existing
network of general partnership case law and forms while opting into limited
liability’.48 Furthermore, the LLP may be more suitable for smaller, less
44 Hillman (n 39) 1399.
45 J Romley and E L Talley ‘Uncorporated Professionals’ USC Law and Economics Research
Paper No 04-22 (2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=587982.
46 L E Ribstein and R R Keatinge, Ribstein and Keatinge on Limited Liability Companies
(2nd edn, Thomson/West, St Paul, 2005) ·2 :1.
47 Hamilton (n 16) 1053–1054. 48 Ribstein (n 42) 833.
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formal ﬁrms because the partnership-style default rules of LLP laws may be
more appropriate than the corporate-style default rules applicable to LLCs.49
Conversely, depending on the applicable state law, the LLC may have the
advantage that the extent of liability protection may go further than with the
LLP.50 Entities which operate in several states may also prefer the LLC be-
cause LLCs are now accepted in all US states. Therefore the members of an
LLC can be sure that they enjoy protection against liability, whereas this is a
matter of debate for LLPs which operate in a state that does not offer full
protection.51
Finally, businesses and professionals need to examine the speciﬁc fee and
tax structure of the state in question. Hamilton nicely illustrates the com-
plexity of these rules in Texas. Having presented the data on newly established
entities, he explains that:
The ﬁgures set forth above are skewed by local rules applicable only in Texas.
For example, corporations and LLCs in Texas are subject to an annual state
franchise tax that is equal to 0.25 per cent of net taxable capital plus 4.5 per cent
of ‘net taxable earned surplus.’ While Texas has no formal personal income tax
at the state level, the second portion of the franchise tax is certainly a form of
income tax in disguise. However, the franchise tax is applicable only to cor-
porations and limited liability companies but not to professional corporations,
professional associations, or limited liability partnerships. LLPs nevertheless,
are subject to a different tax that itself may be relatively onerous: An annual fee
of $200 per year for each partner that is protected by the liability shield.
Professional corporations and professional associations, while providing similar
shields against liability, are subject to neither the franchise tax nor the LLP
annual membership fee. These arbitrary tax rules have a direct impact on basic
decisions. For a law ﬁrm with one hundred partners in Texas, for example, a
professional corporation or professional association entails a signiﬁcant tax
saving as contrasted with either an LLP or LLC.(. . .).52
C. Horizontal Competition: Choice Between US States
Horizontal regulatory competition occurs when someone establishes a com-
pany or partnership in a particular legal system only because that country’s
law is positive for him, thus inﬂuencing legal developments. Three
requirements are necessary to make this competition work:53 First, according
to the rules of private international law, it must, in principle be possible for
companies or partnerships to be able to freely choose a particular legal system
49 A R Bromberg and L E Ribstein, Limited Liability Partnership, The Revised Uniform
Partnership Act and the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2001) (Apen, Austin, 2008)
· 1.04(c),(d).
50 See II A and B above. 51 See II C 1 below.
52 Hamilton (n 16) 1054.
53 For these requirements see M Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law (CUP, Cambridge,
2008) 297–335.
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(‘supply’). Secondly, companies or partnerships must let themselves be ‘at-
tracted’ by a legal system, given free choice (‘demand’). Thirdly, it has to be
clariﬁed whether and how legislators react to these conditions of competition.
1. Supply
In the US companies can freely choose their place of incorporation. In practice
this has mainly led to a market for reincorporations. A mere change in cor-
porate domicile is not possible in the US. However, the merger of an existing
company with a newly-founded shell company in the target state does not pose
signiﬁcant problems and does not lead to taxation of hidden reserves.
According to the internal affairs doctrine the applicable law is usually that of
the place of incorporation, although in states such as California and New York
there are special rules for pseudo-foreign companies.54
Partnership law is more complex. There are only a few differences among
US states in general partnership law. Conversely, with respect to limited
partnerships, LLPs and LLLPs, a number of variations exist, for instance,
regarding the permitted activities of the limited partner and the scope of
liability protection.55 Thus, regulatory competition is conceivable.
Like companies, partnerships can freely choose the place of registration and
thus the applicable law regarding their internal affairs.56 ULPA and RUPA
explicitly state that the law under which a foreign limited (liability) partner-
ship is formed governs the relations among the partners, between the
partners and the partnership, and the liability of partners for an obligation of
the partnership.57 However, there is an exception if the foreign state does not
permit the business in question to be conducted by a limited (liability)
partnership.58 This is relevant in states such as New York and California
wherein only professionals (and not ordinary business) can establish an
LLP.59
A limited partnership has to apply for a certiﬁcate of authority to conduct
business in a foreign state.60 For LLPs the procedure is slightly easier because
only a statement of foreign qualiﬁcation has to be ﬁled.61 Neither the certiﬁ-
cate of authority nor the statement of qualiﬁcation can simply be denied
because of a difference between foreign law and the law under which the
partnership was formed.62 Moreover, the effect of the failure to have a
54 See generally Siems (n 53) 299; L E Ribstein and E A O’Hara, ‘Corporations and the
Market for Law’ [2008] University of Illinois Law Review 661, 716–721 (for the constitutional
protection of the internal affairs doctrine).
55 See II A above.
56 See Ribstein and O’Hara (n 54) 664 and 702; Rutledge (n 20) 221.
57 ULPA s 901(a); RUPA s 1101(a).
58 ULPA s 901(c); RUPA s 1101(c).
59 See II A above. 60 ULPA s 902
61 RUPA s 1102. For differences between states see Hallweger (n 22) 535.
62 ULPA s 901(b); RUPA s 1101(b).
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certiﬁcate or to qualify does not impair the validity of contracts of the part-
nership or waive the limitations of liability.63
A partnership may also decide to change its place of registration from one
state to another. Details depend on the speciﬁc state laws. In Delaware the
procedure is quite straightforward. A partnership which plans a conversion
from a non-Delaware LLP to a Delaware LLP has to ﬁle three simple docu-
ments—a certiﬁcate of conversion, a statement of partnership existence and a
statement of qualiﬁcation—to the Delaware Division of Corporations. The
total costs are US $400.64
Despite all, the role of the local rules should not be underestimated.
Regardless of the place of registration, a professional partnership has to com-
ply with the ethical rules in each state in which it operates.65 In some cases this
may lead to vicarious liability for the ﬁrm’s debt.66 Moreover, it is possible that
differences between the extent of liability protection lower the level of pro-
tection. According to Rutledge, a full shield LLP in a partial shield jurisdiction
will likely afford its partners only partial liability. And an LLLP in a non-
LLLP jurisdiction will likely not afford its general partners limited liability.67
Overall, there is therefore a mixture between ‘type A’ and ‘type B’ regu-
latory competition.68 ‘Type A’ regulatory competition means that persons can
only choose a particular legal system if they also establish residence there.
Thus, there is a ‘bundling effect’ because the residence decision has to balance
all relevant legal and non-legal factors. Conversely, ‘type B’ regulatory
competition is stronger because persons can engage in ‘cherry picking’ by
taking residence in one state and choosing the law of another one. In part-
nership law there is some ‘type B’ regulatory competition because, as a
starting point, other US states have to accept the place of registration and thus
the applicable law. However, so far as local rules play a role, there is only
‘type A’ regulatory competition.
2. Demand
For public corporations it is well established that companies feel ‘attracted’ to
a particular legal system, because 40 per cent of all ﬁrms listed on the NYSE
are incorporated in Delaware.69 There is also some discussion evolving for
63 ULPA s 907(c),(d); RUPA s 1103(b),(c).
64 See http://corp.delaware.gov/Non-DE %20LLP%20to% 20DE%20LLP.pdf. For the con-
version from a Delaware LLP to a non-Delaware entity see http://corp.delaware.gov/
DE%20LLP%20to%20Non-DE %20Entity.pdf.
65 See Ribstein (n 42) 834.
66 See Ribstein and O’Hara (n 54) 695; Bromberg and Ribstein (n 49) · 7.04(b).
67 Rutledge, (n 20) (2006).
68 See K Heine and W Kerber, ‘European Corporate Laws, Regulatory Competition and Path
Dependence’ (2002) 13 European Journal of Law and Economics 47, 51; Siems (n 53) 303.
69 See L A Bebchuk and A Cohen, ‘Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate’ (2003) 46 Journal
of Law and Economics 383, 391.
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LLCs. This is of particular interest here because LLCs and LLPs may often be
functional equivalents.
According to Ribstein and O’Hara, ‘Florida has emerged the clear leader,
with Delaware far behind, and several states bunched not far behind
Delaware’70. In all states but Delaware and Florida LLC formations roughly
reﬂect business activity in the state. Ribstein and O’Hara assume that this
preference for the home state is the result of a simple cost-beneﬁt analysis. For
public corporations the costs of forum shopping are only marginal whereas for
smaller companies the costs are likely to be high compared to the value of the
ﬁrm. In public corporations the beneﬁts of choosing a particular law are also
higher because they are more likely to be subject to shareholder suits and
because using the same standards as other companies facilitates trading of
their shares.71 With respect to Florida’s attractiveness for LLCs, Ribstein and
O’Hara indicate that the ‘Florida bar has used the LLC form to exploit these
advantages in a number of ways, including by making it tax friendly, reducing
fees, and crafting the statute to ﬁt estate planning and asset protection needs’.
Moreover, they emphasize Florida’s general strength in attracting investment,
which, for instance, is the result of ‘a thriving small service business in the real
estate, tourist, and retirement industries.’72
These results are contested by Dammann and Schu¨ndeln. Although, in
general, they too ﬁnd that most LLCs incorporate locally, they ascertain that
46.4 per cent of all LLCs with more than 1000 employees and 26.6 per cent of
all LLCs with 500 and 999 employees are established elsewhere. Moreover,
Dammann and Schu¨ndeln identify Delaware as the preferred jurisdiction be-
cause 42 per cent of all LLCs that are formed outside their principal place of
business (PPB) are incorporated in Delaware. As the main reason for this
preference they ﬁnd ‘statistically signiﬁcant evidence that ﬁrms are less likely
to be formed in their PPB state if the latter offers relatively lenient rules on
managerial liability or if it allows companies to be dissolved via a less than
unanimous resolution of the members’.73
In contrast to public corporations and LLCs it has hardly been discussed
whether partnerships choose a particular legal system. Table 2 presents data
on the number of limited partnerships, LLPs and LLLPs in the ﬁve most
populated US states plus Delaware.
Apart from the absolute ﬁgures, this table also reports the number of part-
nerships per 100,000 inhabitants. These ﬁgures provide some indication of
whether a state attracts partnerships whose main business is elsewhere. To be
sure, the number of partnerships per capita is not a perfect proxy for pseudo-
foreign partnerships because it can also reﬂect the general business climate of a
particular state. However, at least to some extent, the ﬁgures for Delaware are
likely to be driven by Delaware’s law. Delaware dominates the market for
70 Ribstein and O’Hara (n 54) 703. 71 ibid.
72 ibid 704. 73 Dammann and Schu¨ndeln (n 43).
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publicly held or ‘master’ limited partnerships. In particular, every ‘master’
limited partnership traded on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ is a Delaware
limited partnership.75 On the one hand, this can be a result of Delaware’s
partnership law. The Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act em-
phasizes that maximum effect shall be given to the principle of freedom of
contract,76 and it allows limited partners to be granted some powers to supervise
their investment.77 On the other hand, it is likely that the general virtues of
Delaware also play role. In particular, there are presumably some network
effects at work because the specialized and qualiﬁed bar, bench and legislation
of Delaware can guarantee practice-oriented application of the law.78
With respect to the other states one can speculate about some speciﬁc
points. In New York and California only professionals can form an LLP,79
which may have contributed to its relatively low use. The higher ﬁgure for
Florida is presumably not speciﬁcally related to its LLP law but, rather, acts
mainly as a reﬂection of the good general business climate, because the LLC is
more popular than the LLP by a greater margin in Florida than elsewhere.80
The popularity of the LLP in Texas may result from the fact that there the LLP
has a longer tradition than in other states.81 Illinois was the last of the six states
of this table to provide a full shield against liability for partners of an LLP,82
thus possibly explaining the relative low number of LLPs.
It is also interesting to examine whether partnerships from states which still
provide only partial liability shields ‘emigrate’ to full shield states. The ﬁnal
column of Table 3 shows that in states with a full shield liability three times
Table 2. Partnerships formed in 200674









California 4,033 419 n.a. 33,871,648 11.91 1.24 n.a.
Delaware 9,901 114 139 783,600 1263.53 14.55 17.74
Florida 1,543 492 Incl. in LP 15,982,378 9.65 3.08 n.a.
Illinois 603 188 Incl. in LLP 12,419,293 4.86 1.51 n.a.
New York 560 319 n.a. 18,976,457 2.95 1.68 n.a.
Texas 16,355 5,310 n.a. 20,851,820 78.43 25.47 n.a.
74 Sources: IACA (n 43) (for the number of partnerships); http://www.census.gov/ (for the
population data) Note that the legal form of the LLLP is not available in California, Florida,
Illinois, New York, and Texas.
75 See Ribstein and O’Hara (n 54) 705; J Goodgame, ‘Master Limited Partnership
Governance’ (2005) 60 Business Lawyer 471, 485–486.
76 DRULPA, · 17-1101(c). 77 See II.A above.
78 For corporate law see Romano (n 1); Siems (n 53) 319.
79 See II.A above. 80 See II.B above.
81 See II.A above.
82 See Illinois Partnership Act 205/15(b) (as amended in 2002).
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more LLPs are established than in partial shield states. The difference between
these two groups is, however, not statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 per cent
level.84 Moreover, it is beyond the scope of this article to examine empirically
where the ‘missing LLPs’ of the partial shield states may be found. Although
it is possible that at least some of them have established an LLP in another
state, it is also likely that many of them keep the faith to their home state but
incorporate as an S-Corporation or an LLC.
3. Reaction of law-makers
The reactions of law-makers in the market for publicly held corporations are
well discussed. Delaware’s legislature depends on the ﬁrms that have only
their registered seat there. It receives from them a one-off incorporation fee
and a periodic franchise tax. Since this ﬁnancial advantage has—by contrast
with bigger states—a signiﬁcant effect on the state budget, there is a credible
commitment that the law will remain business-friendly. Other smaller states
may have a similar incentive. However, it is sometimes stated that today
Delaware’s position is now so dominant that other states do not really compete
with it.85
For LLCs it is assumed that legislators would not be competing for fran-
chise fees.86 However, there is some evidence that lawyers have successfully
inﬂuenced law-makers, thus leading to some regulatory competition.87 The
outcome of this development is, on the one hand, that the state LLC statutes





Partial shield states (data for 10 states available) 1,204 61,138,415 2.373
Full shield states (data for 31 states available) 11,511 192,771,064 7.312
Full shield states without Texas (30 states) 6,201 171,919,244 6.726
83 Sources: IACA (n 43) (for the data on partnerships); http://www.census.gov/ (for the
population data); Sandra K Miller and James J Tucker III, Limit Practice Liability, September,
2005, available at https://www.aicpa.org/PUBS/jofa//sep2005/miller.doc (for the information
about partial and full shield states).
84 The results of Student’s t-test are t: 1.341; p: 0.187 (with Texas); t: 1.213; p: 0.232 (without
Texas). This means that there is a probability of 18.7 per cent (with Texas) and 23.2 per cent.
85 L A Bebchuk and A Hamdani, ‘Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the
Competition over Corporate Charters’ (2002) 112 Yale Law Journal 553.
86 Ribstein (n 42) 833.
87 See C R Goforth, ‘The Rise of the Limited Liability Company: Evidence of a Race
Between the States, But Heading Where?’ (1995) 45 Syracuse Law Review 1193; Ribstein (n 42)
833.
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have evolved towards some uniformity.88 On the other hand, the 1999 and
2002 revisions of the Florida LLC Act indicate that the law is becoming more
ﬂexible and business friendly by reducing the protection of creditors.89
The reactions of law-makers in partnership law show some similarity to
these developments. Delaware dominates the market for limited partnerships,
likewise the market for public corporations. The ﬂexible structure of the law is
presumably a key factor in Delaware’s success. The state LLP laws also drive
towards some uniformity, similar to the law applicable to the LLC. For
instance, this can be seen in the trend towards full shield liability, which has
the advantage that the partners can reduce their monitoring costs,90 whereas
creditors lose protection.
The fees that all but general partnerships have to pay may be some incentive
to attract foreign partnerships. However, the major difference with public
corporations is that most partnerships (with the exception of master limited
partnerships) are considerably smaller than public corporations. It is therefore
unlikely that partnership fees do (or will) play a major role for the budget
of any state. Rather the main driving forces are presumably the entities
themselves91 and the networks (such as lawyers)92 that may beneﬁt from an
attractive partnership law.
D. Conclusion
US partnership law—and the law on related forms of company—has seen a
dynamic development in the last few decades. At least to some extent, this has
led to both vertical and horizontal competition. In most states businesses and
professions can freely choose between a number of entity forms, such as
LLPs, LLCs and different types of corporations. Moreover, states themselves
care about the attractiveness of their partnership law. This is most noticeable
for the law on limited partnerships in Delaware and one can also identify some
regulatory competition for the ‘best’ LLP law.
Can a similar development be expected in Europe? An analogy may be
tempting because in Europe too there are general, limited and (occasionally)
limited liability partnerships as well as limited liability companies as potential
substitutes. However, the differences between the US and the EU also need to
be analysed. For instance, on the one hand, the trend towards limited liability
88 See B H Kobayashi and L E Ribstein, ‘Evolution and Spontaneous Uniformity: Evidence
from the Evolution of the Limited Liability Company’ (1996) 34 Economic Inquiry 464.
89 See Ribstein and Ohara (n 54) 704.
90 For this rationale see L E Ribstein, ‘Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation’
(1991) 50 Modern Law Review 80, 101. For further references see J A McCahery ‘Introduction’
in J A McCahery, T Raaijmakers, and E P M Vermeulen, The Governance of Close Corporations
and Partnerships—US and European Perspectives (OUP, Oxford, 2004) 4–5.
91 For the LLP in Texas see II A above.
92 See D J Weidner, ‘Pitfalls in Partnership Law Reform: Some US Experience’ in McCahery
et al (n 89) 359.
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in the US is partly driven by the excessive tort risk after the ‘tort revolution’ in
US law, which does not have a European counterpart.93 On the other hand, one
needs to consider for the EU whether the freedom of establishment of the
Treaty may foster, and differences in legal traditions and culture may impede,
regulatory competition in partnership law.
III. THE SITUATION IN THE EU
The structure of this section will follow the framework used for the US. The
main focus will be on UK, German and French law. First, the different types of
partnerships will be outlined. This is slightly more complex than in the US
because in the EU there are more signiﬁcant differences between states.
Secondly, here too, it must be considered which types of companies may be
used instead of partnerships (‘vertical competition’). Thirdly, whether ‘hori-
zontal competition’ in partnership law can be expected in the EU is examined.
A. Types of Partnerships
1. General and limited partnerships
In all European countries there are general and limited partnerships. The law
of the UK is in many respects more or less identical to that of the US states.94
Like in the US, general partnerships are highly informal and unregistered.
Limited partnerships need to be registered at Company House in Cardiff
(for England and Wales), Edinburgh (for Scotland) or Belfast (for Northern
Ireland).95 Liability is usually unlimited for all partners, except with regard to
limited partners in limited partnerships who do not take part in management
and so are not liable for the acts of the ﬁrm.96 Like in the US, in Scotland
limited partnerships have legal personality, but this is not the case in
England.97 While English law permits partnerships to sue or to be sued in the
ﬁrm’s name, this does not change the substantive law.98
There were 568,000 partnerships in the UK in 2002, out of which 10,369
were limited partnerships.99 British limited partnerships are particularly
popular in the investment industry, being used by private equity, venture
93 Ribstein (n 42) 836, 853. See also P W Huber, Liability: The Legal Revolution and Its
Consequences (Basic Books, New York, 1988).
94 D A DeMott, ‘Transatlantic Perspectives on Partnership Law: Risk and Instability’ (2001)
26 Journal of Corporation Law 879 (however, differences in the default rules on dissolution of a
partnership).
95 Limited Partnerships Act 1907 art 8. See also http://www.companieshouse.gov.uk/
index.shtml. 96 Limited Partnerships Act 1907 art 5.
97 Partnership Act 1890 s 4(2).
98 M Blackett-Ord, Partnership Law (Tottel 1997) 404.
99 DTI, Reform of Partnership Law: The Ecnomic Impact—A Consultation Document, April
2004, paras 4.2 and 4.3.
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capital and property investment funds.100 However, the Channel Islands of
Jersey and Guernsey are strong competitors. These two jurisdictions can boast
that their laws on limited partnerships have a number of advantages compared
with English law. In Jersey and Guernsey limited partners can participate in
the management of the partnership to a larger extent than under English law
without losing liability protection. The names of the limited partners do not
have to be disclosed in a public register. In Guernsey limited partnerships
can choose to have a separate legal personality. Moreover, a favourable tax
treatment and liberal investment and accounting laws contribute to the
attractiveness of Jersey’s and Guernsey’s law.101
The next years may see a modernization of the law on limited partnerships
in the UK. In 2003 a joined report of the (English and Welsh) Law
Commission and the Scottish Law Commission set out extensive proposals to
reform partnership law.102 In 2006 the government decided to focus on the
reform of limited partnership law.103 Based on the report of the law com-
missions this reform may, for example, provide that limited partnerships are
able to opt for an entity status, and clarify and extend whether and how limited
partners can be involved in the business of the partnership.104
For German and French law one must distinguish between partnerships
under civil law and partnerships under commercial law. All partners of a
partnership under civil law (‘BGB-Gesellschaft’; ‘socie´te´ civile’) are person-
ally liable.105 In France, but not in Germany, creditors can sue a partner only
after ﬁrstly suing in vain the partnership itself.106 Another difference is that
only in France is the civil partnership regarded as a legal person (‘entite´ jur-
idique’ or ‘personne morale’).107 However, in Germany, the Federal Supreme
Court decided in 2001 that the civil partnership has ‘legal capacity’
(‘Rechtsfa¨higkeit’), thus it can enter into contracts, own property, sue and be
sued in its own name.108 Typical examples of partnerships under civil law are
100 DTI (n 98) paras 4.3 and 4.4; JA McCahery and EPM Vermeulen, ‘Limited Partnership
Reform in the United Kingdom: A Competitive, Venture Capital Oriented Business Form’ (2004)
5 European Business Organization Law Review 61.
101 See eg http://www.altassets.net/casefor/countries/2003/nz4014.php; http://www.
louvregroup.com/pdfs/partnerships.pdf; http://www.thelawyer.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=117415
&d=122&h=24&f=46.
102 The Law Commission and The Scottish Law Commission, Partnership Law, Reports Law
Com No 283 and Scot Law Com No 192, 2003 (515 pages), available at http://www.lawcom.
gov.uk/docs/lc283-2.pdf. See also G Morse, ‘Partnerships for the 21st Century?—Limited
Liability Partnerships and Partnership Law Reform in the United Kingdom’ [2002] Singapore
Journal of Legal Studies 455.
103 See http://www.berr.gov.uk/bbf/partnership/page25911.html.
104 DTI Summary of Responses to the Consultation on Reform of Partnership Law: The
Economic Impact, July 2006, para 2.13; McCahery and Vermeulen (n 99) 79.
105 French Code Civil art 1857; German Civil Code (BGB) · 714.
106 French Code Civil art 1858. 107 French Code Civil art 1842.
108 BGHZ 146, 34. For a comment see O Maaß and M Siems, ‘Die Rechtsfa¨higkeit
der Gesellschaft bu¨rgerlichen Rechts in Deutschland—Ein Vorbild fu¨r O¨sterreich?’ [2002]
Wirtschaftsrechtliche Bla¨tter (wbl) 2002, 149 (also dealing with Austrian law).
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law ﬁrms. In France these partnerships must also comply with the law on the
‘socie´te´ civile professionnelle’ (SCP),109 which, for instance, provides default
rules on the representation and decision making of partnerships established by
professionals.110
German and French commercial partnerships must observe more formal-
ities than partnerships under civil law, such as registration and accounting
requirements. Like in the US and the UK, there is a distinction between
general and limited partnerships. The former is called ‘Offene Handelsge-
sellschaft’ (OHG) in Germany and ‘socie´te´ en nom collectif’ (SNC) in France.
Here all partners are personally liable, although the creditor must ﬁrst exhaust
the partnerships assets.111 In a limited partnership—called ‘Kommanditge-
sellschaft’ (KG) in Germany and ‘socie´te´ en commandite simple’ (SCS) in
France—the limited partners are not personally liable for the debts of the
partnership except for the amount of their contribution.112 Like the partnership
under civil law, French commercial partnerships are legal persons whereas
German commercial partnerships only have ‘legal capacity’.113
From a comparative perspective it is interesting that in many respects the
German and French laws on limited partnerships already conform to the chan-
ges which are suggested for the UK. The limited partnership is a legal person in
France. The German and French laws are also more liberal than UK law as it
can be agreed that the limited partners take part in the internal administration
of the partnership. In contrast to English law (and the former US law) this
does not have the effect that they are treated like general partners.114
This raises the question why in the investment industry the limited part-
nership of UK law is more popular than its French and German counterparts.
The main reasons are presumably to be found outside the codiﬁed partnership
law. It is possible that the substantial body of case law and the highly
respected judiciary of the UK play a role.115 Since partnership law contains
mainly default rules and since investment contracts often require legal
agreements different from normal partnerships,116 it is also likely that the
major London law ﬁrms and business advisors as well as the English language
contribute to the use of UK partnership law. Lastly, the popularity of UK
limited partnerships for investment activities is presumably inﬂuenced by
109 Loi no 66-879 du 29 novembre 1966 relative aux socie´te´s civiles professionnelles.
110 Loi no 66-879 arts 11, 13, 14.
111 French Code de Commerce art L 221-1(2); German Commercial Code (HGB) ·· 124, 128.
112 French Code de Commerce art L. 222-(2); German Commercial Code (HGB) ·· 161(1),
171.
113 French Code de Commerce art L 210-6; German Commercial Code (HGB) ·· 124, 161(2).
114 Generally see J Heenen, ‘Partnerships and Other Personal Associations for Proﬁt, in
International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Mohr, Tu¨bingen, 1975) paras 1–167 (but also
para 1–172: no authority to represent partnership); For Germany see also German Commercial
Code (HGB) · 163. For the UK see Limited Partnerships Act 1908 art 5.
115 McCahery and Vermeulen (n 99) 76.
116 McCahery and Vermeulen (n 99) 71–72.
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other areas of law (such as tax law or ﬁnancial law)117 and the general
standing of London as the main ﬁnancial centre of Europe.
2. Partnerships without personal liability
In 2000 the UK followed the lead of the US states and Jersey118 in allowing
limited liability partnerships (LLPs).119 The UK LLP is a mixture between a
partnership and a company and it has even been said that it is closer to the
LLC than to the LLP of the US states.120 With regard to terminology, it is
interesting that the UK law uses the term ‘members’ of the LLP, thus avoiding
both the terms ‘partners’ and ‘shareholders’.
In substance, the LLP shows a number of similarities to companies. First,
the LLP has to be registered at the relevant Company House.121 The applicants
have to pay a registration fee and the LLP comes into existence upon incor-
poration. Secondly, the LLP has separate legal personality, distinct from its
members.122 Therefore it can own property, sue and be sued in its own name,
and its existence is independent of changes in membership. Thirdly, the
members of the LLP do not usually incur personal liability. However, there can
be liability based on the tort of negligence. Whether such an action is suc-
cessful depends on whether personal responsibility has been assumed for the
advice, which has then been relied upon.123 This is potentially wide because
the courts may apply an assumption of personal responsibility.124 Therefore,
the members of an LLP may be advised to avoid becoming personally ident-
iﬁed with a speciﬁc act or mission, for instance by carefully written letters of
engagement.125 Fourthly, in many respects, the running of the LLP is similar to
the running of a company. In particular, LLPs have to draw up accounts and
ﬁle them with Company House.126 These requirements are the same as those
for limited companies. In general, the accounts have to be audited, except in
LLPs with turnover up to £1 million. Fifthly, the LLP can use a ﬂoating charge.
117 See J Armour ‘Law, Innovation and Finance: A Review’ in J A McCahery and L
Renneeboog (eds), Venture Capital Contracting and the Valuation of Hi-Tech Firms (OUP,
Oxford, 2003) 133–161, who also refers to the role of insolvency and labour law for venture
capital investment.
118 On the US see III A above, on Jersey see III C 3 below.
119 Introduced by Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2002.
120 J Whittaker and J Machell, The Law of Limited Liability Partnerships (Jordans, Bristol,
2004) para 17.9. 121 Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000 ss 2, 3.
122 Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000 s 1.
123 Cabvision Ltd v Feetum & Marsden (Feetum v Levy) [2005] 1 WLR 2576, [2005] EWCA
Civ 1601; Tower Taxi Technology LLP v Marsden & ors [2005] EWHC 1084, [2005] EWCA Civ
1503. 124 See eg Whittaker and Machell (n 119) paras 15.5–15.14.
125 See S Young, Limited Liability Partnerships Handbook (Tottel, Edinburgh, 2007) para
20.5.
126 Limited Liability Partnerships Regulation 2001 s 3; Limited Liability Partnerships
(Amendments) Regulations 2005.
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Since this security over a group of changing assets must be entered in the
companies register, it can be used by the LLP but not by other partnerships.127
In other respects, the LLP continues to display features of a partnership.
Concerning the internal affairs of the partnership, the members of the LLP
enjoy organisational ﬂexibility. For instance, the LLP agreement may state who
represents the partnership, how proﬁts are distributed and how decisions be-
tween the members are taken. The default rules are that all members take part in
the management of the LLP and that all of them have equal rights and duties.128
Furthermore, the LLP is classiﬁed as a partnership for tax purposes.129 Thus
only the members, not the LLP itself, are subject to taxation. This is particularly
relevant for large ﬁrms with highly paid individuals as corporation tax provides
relief for smaller ﬁrms, and an exemption from national insurance contributions
may encourage the incorporation of a limited company.130
Critics submitted that the LLP was unlikely to be accepted by practice.131
For instance, they criticised the reference to company law and argued the lack
of a standard form constitution would lead to great complexity. Moreover, the
running of an LLP was feared to be too complex and expensive, because the
accounting, auditing, ﬁling and disclosure requirements of company law were
too burdensome for partnerships. Empirical data show however that an in-
creasing number of LLPs have been set up, and that the number of newly
established LLPs has also been growing (Table 4). In particular, the LLP is a
popular legal form for law and audit ﬁrms.132






31 March 2003 4,442 n.a.
31 March 2004 7,396 2,954
31 March 2005 11,924 4,528
31 March 2006 17,499 5,575
31 March 2007 24,555 7,056
24 February 2008 31,070 7,272134
29 June 2008 33,903 8,142135
127 See Freedman, ‘Limited Liability Partnerships in the United Kingdom—Do They Have a
Role for Small Firms?’ (2001) 26 Journal of Corporation Law 897, 912.
128 Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000 ss 5, 6; Limited Liability Partnerships Regulation
2001 s 7. 129 Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000 s 7; Finance Act 2001.
130 See Freedman (n 126) 914. See also III B 1 below.
131 See Freedman (n 126) 902–903.
132 For instance, the ‘Big Four’: PwC LLP, KPMG LLP, Deloitte & Touche LLP, Ernst &
Young LLP.
133 Source: http://www.companieshouse.gov.uk/about/businessRegisterStat.shtml.
134 Estimation based on shorter period. 135 ibid.
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In Germany the legal entity most similar to the UK LLP is the
‘Partnerschaftsgesellschaft’ (PartG).136 It was speciﬁcally introduced for
professions such as lawyers or auditors. In many respects the PartG is similar
to the general commercial partnership (OHG).137 There is, however, some
protection against liability: ‘[I]f only some of the partners were involved in
the operation of a particular contract, only they are personally responsible
(besides the partnership itself), unless their involvement is regarded as sub-
ordinate’.138 In other words, the partners who were not involved in a particular
operation are protected from incurring liability.
Other business enterprises also have the possibility of choosing a partner-
ship without personal liability. They can form a limited partnership (KG),
whose only general partner is a German limited liability company (GmbH).
This ‘GmbH & Co KG’ is highly popular: 145,000 out of the 175,000 KGs are
GmbH & Co KGs.139 The drawback of a GmbH & Co KG is that one must
also incorporate a GmbH. This requires E25,000 minimum capital and com-
pliance with the rules on capital maintenance. Still, the main entity is the
partnership (the KG); therefore, a GmbH & Co KG has the advantage of a
more ﬂexible governance and ﬁnance than a pure GmbH.
A one-sided method of liability protection is the ‘silent partnership’ (‘stille
Gesellschaft’).140 The person who runs the business deals with third parties in
his or her own name and therefore incurs personal liability, whereas the silent
partner’s participation in the business is purely ﬁnancial. The silent partner-
ship is not registered, it does not have ‘legal capacity’ and it does not do any
own business. Therefore, the risk of the silent partner is limited to his or her
own investment.
In France there is no entity like the LLP or the PartG. However, it is possible
that a company is the only general partner of a limited partnership.141 French
law also provides for a ‘silent partnership’, which is called ‘socie´te´ en partici-
pation’ (SEP).142 Like in Germany, the SEP is an unregistered and undisclosed
partnership, which does not do business with third parties. It is also the only
partnership under French law which does not have separate legal personality.
It can be concluded that the UK LLP does not have a direct equivalent in
German and French law. The German PartG is most similar to it. However, in
contrast to the LLP, it is only available to certain professions, and provides
only partial protection against liability. The option of using a limited
136 Gesetz of 25 July 1994, BGBl I 1994, 1744 (PartGG).
137 In PartGG ·· 4(1)(s1), 6(3)(s.2), 7(2)-(4), 8(2)(s2), 9(1), 10(2) there are even explicit re-
ferences to the OHG law.
138 · 8(2) PartGG as modiﬁed by Gesetz of 22 July 1998, BGBl I 1878 (author’s translation).
139 Business Guide Niedersachsen, 2007, available at http://www.invest-in-germany.com/
uploads/media/BusinessGuide_Niedersachsen.pdf.
140 German Commercial Code (HGB) ·· 230–236.
141 See C J Mesnooh, Law and Business in France (Nijhoff, Boston, 1994) 77.
142 French Code Civil art 1871. See also Heenen (n 113) para 1-1 (participation association has
no equivalent in England).
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partnership with a company as general partner is also not as convenient as an
LLP, because it requires two entities (a company and a partnership). Finally,
the ‘silent partnership’ (or SEP) only protects the ‘silent partner’, not the
person who is actually dealing with third parties. Overall, it could therefore be
plausible to suggest that German and French businesses try to use the LLP
instead of their domestic forms of partnership—unless forms of company
provide a sufﬁcient alternative.
B. Vertical competition: Alternative Forms of Doing Business
1. Companies and partnerships in general
The most likely competitor to the LLP is the limited company. Here too there
is usually liability protection for all members/shareholders (in contrast to the
limited partnership). Both legal forms are also typically used in a way where
there is no separation between ownership and control as the members/share-
holders are themselves involved in the running of the business (in contrast to
public companies). Thus, one may wonder whether the lack of an LLP law has
resulted in more limited companies in Germany and France. Table 5, however,
shows a quite different result because there are considerably more limited
companies in the UK than in Germany and France.
For Germany this may be partly due to the fact that the German GmbH law
is less business friendly than UK law, in particular due to its high minimum
capital of E 25,000.145 However, differences in the laws on limited companies



















10,369 33,903 2,118,700 11,500
Germany 175,000144 5,237 995,940 15,033
France data n.a n.a. 1,123,194 71,173
143 For the UK data on limited partnerships and LLPs see n 98 and 132; the UK data on limited
and public companies are based on Commission Staff Working Document, Impact assessment on
the Directive on the cross-border transfer of registered ofﬁce, SEC(2007) 1707, Annex I
Table A 2. For the German data on KGs, GmbHs, and AGs see n 138; the German data on PartGs
are based on T Lenz in W Meilicke (ed), Partnerschaftsgesellschaftsgesetz (2nd edn, Beck,
Munich, 2006), · 1 para 13; The French data are based on http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau.
asp?ref_id=NATnon09222&reg_id=0.
144 145,000 of these are GmbH & Co KG, see III A 2, above.
145 GmbHG ·5(1). However, the Gesetz zur Modernisierung des GmbH-Rechts und zur
Beka¨mpfung von Missbra¨uchen (MoMiG) of 23 October 2008, BGBi. I 2008, 2026, has
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cannot explain the French data because in 2003 the French SARL law was
modernized with, for example, the minimum capital reduced to E1.146 The
high number of French public companies (SAs and SASs)147 is also only a
partial substitute for the relative low number of French limited companies. If
one adds all forms of limited liability entities (ie the ﬁnal three columns), it
can be seen that in total there are about twice as many of these entities in the
UK than in Germany or France.148 Thus, the high number of UK limited
companies is presumably not only a result of a favourable company law but
driven by general socio-legal factors which foster entrepreneurship.
Focussing on the data for the UK one can note that there are 62.5 times
more limited companies than LLPs. This is somehow similar to the situation in
the US where in the states examined in the previous part there are between 11
(Texas) and 250 (Florida) more new LLCs than LLPs.149 A difference be-
tween the US and the UK is, however, that the US LLC is taxed as a part-
nership whereas the British limited company is taxed as a company. There are
also further differences between UK and US tax law. Freedman explains this
in more detail:
(W)hile it is clear in the United States that the LLP and LLC have major tax
advantages for small ﬁrms over incorporation, the U.K. tax position is quite
different. The double taxation of corporate proﬁts experienced under the pure
classiﬁcation system of corporate tax in the United States means that tax trans-
parent business forms bring serious tax savings. In the United Kingdom, corpor-
ate distributions are not subject to such extensive double taxation as in the United
States, due to the availability of tax credits for shareholders on dividends in many
cases. It follows that the tax pressures to move away from incorporation are not so
great for United Kingdom as for United States small businesses. Indeed, due to
the introduction of small corporation tax reliefs, such as a ten percent corporation
tax starting rate if relevant proﬁts do not exceed £10,000, incorporation may be a
beneﬁcial way for small businesses to shelter proﬁts in some circumstances.150
Therefore a better explanation is that the US-/UK LLP differs from the LLC/
limited company in not being a legal form aimed at all types of business.
Rather the LLP has a special purpose because it responds to the needs of
particular professions such as lawyers and auditors. Thus, the following sec-
tion will examine the special case of law ﬁrms, in particular, whether in
France and Germany forms of company are available to law ﬁrms which may
make it unnecessary to use the LLP.
introduced a new type of limited company (‘Unternehmensgesellschaft’), which can be started
with a minimal capital of E 1 but which has to allocate one quarter of its annual proﬁts to its
capital reserve until the E25,000 level is achieved.
146 Loi no 2003-721 du 1er aouˆt 2003 pour l’initiative e´conomique.
147 The SAS is a simpliﬁed form of SA (eg regarding its corporate governance and restrictions
on the transfer of shares), aimed at smaller companies.
148 Precisely, it is 1.8 times more than France and 2.1 times more than Germany.
149 See II B above. 150 Freedman (n 126) 903–904 (footnotes omitted).
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2. Law ﬁrms in France and Germany
Since 1990 French law ﬁrms can incorporate as a company.151 For these
‘socie´te´s d’exercice liberal’ (SELs) it is, for instance, a requirement that the
lawyers hold more than half of the shares152 and there are further restrictions
on who can participate in the company.153 There is also a special provision on
personal liability. Despite the fact that shareholders of a company are usually
not personally liable, there is an exception for SELs: ‘each lawyer is respon-
sible for his or her own conduct and can therefore become personally liable in
addition to the SEL’.154
In detail, there are ﬁve different types of SEL, depending on the form of
company that is chosen: the SELARL is a limited liability SEL, the SELAFA
is a public SEL, the SELAS is a simpliﬁed public SEL, the SECA is an
association limited by shares SEL, and the EURL is a one-person SEL.155 The
most popular form is the SELARL (Table 6), because it is most ﬂexible and
does not require minimum capital.156
Table 6. Law ﬁrms in France157







SELARL 418 721 989 1148 174.6% 12.8% 25.9%
SELAFA 132 246 221 188 42.4% 4.0% 4.2%
SELAS – – 34 59 n.a. 0.0% 1.3%
SELCA – 2 5 8 n.a. 0.0% 0.2%
EURL 14 18 18 27 0.5% 0.4% 0.6%
SCP 1997 2138 2262 2267 13.5% 61.1% 51.2%
SEP 32 26 24 31 x3.1% 1.0% 0.7%
Association158 628 647 645 663 5.6% 19.2% 15.0%
Others 47 44 41 39 x16.9% 1.4% 0.9%
151 Loi no 90-1258 du 31 de´cembre 1990 relative a` l’exercice sous forme de socie´te´s des
professions libe´rales soumises a` un statut le´gislatif ou re´glementaire ou dont le titre est prote´ge´ et
aux socie´te´s de participations ﬁnancie`res de professions libe´rales. All legal forms which law ﬁrms
are allowed to use can be found in Loi no 71-1130 du 31 de´cembre 1971 portant re´forme
de certaines professions judiciaires et juridiques, art 7 (as amended).
152 Loi no 90-1258 art 5(1). 153 Loi no 90-1258 art 5(2).
154 Loi no 90-1258 art 16 (author’ translation).
155 Loi no 90-1258 art 2.
156 Code de Commerce Art L 223-2 in contrast to Art L 224-2 (E37,000 minimum capital for
French joint-stock companies).
157 Source: Observatoire du Conseil National des Barreaux (Janvier 2005) 13.
158 The ‘association’ is just a loose form of collaboration (cf Loi du 1er juillet 1901 relative au
contrat d’association); lawyers contract with clients in their own name and remain personally
liable.
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Comparing companies and partnerships it can be seen that the use of part-
nerships (SCPs and SEPs) and associations has been more popular than the
incorporation as an SEL. However, there is a trend towards incorporation. In
1997 there were 4.7 times more partnerships and associations than SELs, in
2004 this ﬁgure dropped to 2.5, and in 2007 there are just 1.3 times as many
partnerships and associations than SELs.159
The development in Germany started a few years later. In 1995 the Supreme
Court of Bavaria decided that law ﬁrms can incorporate as a limited liability
company (GmbH).160 Details were subsequently regulated in special rules on
the ‘Lawyer-GmbH’ (‘Rechtsanwaltsgesellschaft’).161 For instance, it is a
requirement that only other legal advisors are shareholders of a Lawyer-
GmbH, that lawyers have to hold the majority of the votes, that the estab-
lishment of a Lawyer-GmbH needs approval from the local bar association
and that a special insurance is provided.162 In 2005 the German Federal
Supreme Court decided that lawyers can also incorporate as a public company
(AG).163 There is some legal uncertainty as to what is required for in-
corporating and running a Lawyer-AG but presumably the requirements are
similar to those for the Lawyer-GmbH.164
Empirical data shows that in Germany all three legal forms which provide
(some) liability protection are growing in importance (see Table 7). The PartG














1997 85,105 78 11 0 91.65 12.93 0.00
2000 104,967 n.a. 42 0 n.a. 40.01 0.00
2001 110,367 n.a. 75 0 n.a. 67.96 0.00
2002 116,305 n.a. 122 0 n.a. 104.90 0.00
2003 121,420 n.a. 159 0 n.a. 130.95 0.00
2004 126,793 1,061 168 0 836.80 132.50 0.00
2005 132,569 1,286 179 0 970.06 135.02 0.00
2006 138,104 1,645 217 0 1,191.13 157.13 0.00
2007 142,830 1,725 260 5 1,207.73 182.03 3.50
2008 146,910 2,061 297 8 1,402.90 202.16 5.45
159 Source: Obserratoire do Conseil National des Barreaux (Octobre 2008) 53, available at
http://www.cnb.avocat.fr/OBSERVATOIRE-ACTUACITES_r18.html.
160 BayObLG, NJW 1995, 199.
161 Gesetz of 31 August 1998, BGBl I, 2600 (enacting ·· 59 c ff. BRAO).
162 BRAO, ·· 59 d, e, j. 163 BGH, NJW 2005, 1568.
164 However, according to OLG Hamm (decision of 26 June 2006 Az 15 W 213/05) no ap-
proval from the local bar association is necessary.
165 Source: Bundesrechtsanwaltskammer, available at http://www.brak.de. It is not reported
how many lawyers have established a partnership under civil law (‘BGB Gesellschaft’).
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is, however, considerably more popular than Lawyer-GmbH and Lawyer-AG.
Comparing the German data with the French, it can also be seen that there are
less incorporated law ﬁrms in Germany than in France. A likely explanation
for this is that in Germany there is less need for incorporation because the
PartG already provides some protection against liability.166
This leads to the general question whether in France and Germany the
possibility of using the corporate form makes it unnecessary to introduce a
UK-style LLP. In a second step, the next part167 will then examine whether
French and German (law) ﬁrms can and would also choose the UK LLP itself,
thus, leading to competition between Member States’ partnership laws.
The establishment of a UK-style LLP is easier than the incorporation of a
company. A partnership does not require minimum capital, in contrast to all
German and most French forms of company. There are also fewer formalities.
For instance, in order to establish a UK LLP one needs only ﬁle an application
with Company House but there is no need for a notarial deed (unlike in most
civil law countries).168
The liability protection of a UK LLP under partnership law is as good as the
liability protection for companies. However, the tort of negligence can result
in personal liability of the lawyer who represents the LLP in a particular
case.169 The extent of liability protection is therefore somewhat inferior to that
of a lawyer who is a shareholder in a German Lawyer-GmbH because only in
exceptional cases would German courts ‘lift the veil’ of the GmbH170 or as-
sume a separate quasi-contractual relationship between a lawyer of a Lawyer-
GmbH and a client.171 The situation is quite different in France. Here even the
lawyer who is the shareholder of an SEL is always personally liable for his or
her own conduct. Thus a UK-style LLP would offer better liability protection.
Several aspects have to be considered for the running of a law ﬁrm. In some
regards one may falsely expect differences between companies and LLPs.
Typically, it is easier for companies to attract external capital; however, they
must fulﬁl stricter accounting and disclosure requirements. Yet, as previously
mentioned, external investment in the equity of incorporated law ﬁrms is
usually not allowed. Thus, in both types of legal entities, the same lawyers are
usually the members/shareholder as well as the mangers/directors.172 The
166 See III.A.2 above. 167 See III.C below.
168 See also J A McCahery, EPM Vermeulen, M Hisatake, and J Saito ‘The New Company
Law—What Matters in an Innovative Economy?’ Working Paper 2006, available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=942993 33, 43. 169 See III A 2 above.
170 See eg W Zo¨llner in Baumbach and Hueck, GmbHG (18th edn, Beck, Munich, 2006),
Anhang GmbH-Konzernrecht, para 114.
171 See eg V Triebel and D Silny, ‘Die perso¨nliche Haftung der Gesellschafter einer in
Deutschland ta¨tigen englischen Rechtsanwalts-LLP’ (2007) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift
(NJW) 1034, 1036.
172 However, in the UK the Legal Services Act 2007, ss 71-111 allows ‘Alternative Business
Structures’ (ABS) with external ownership. Presumably it will take until 2011 until these new
structures can be authorised (see http://www.sra.org.uk/sra/legal-services-act.page). For a com-
parative analysis of liberalisations of law ﬁrm structures see Commission Staff Working
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accounting and disclosure requirement are also similar. In contrast to ordinary
partnerships, the LLP has to comply with the same rules applicable to limited
companies. Both for limited companies and LLPs there are some exceptions
for small ﬁrms.
In other aspects the LLP is indeed more attractive than incorporated law
ﬁrms. LLPs do not have to comply with the company law rules on capital
maintenance.173 This can also reduce personal liability because shareholders
who deal with their own company often face the risk that their claims are
subordinated in case of insolvency.174 Furthermore, it can be an advantage
that LLPs are taxed as partnerships. Although this is not always straight-
forward, pass-through taxation can be beneﬁcial for ﬁrms with many highly
paid individuals.175
Overall, the possibility of incorporating law ﬁrms only partially substitutes
for the LLP. Since establishing and running an LLP is typically easier than
establishing and running a company, German and French law ﬁrms (or other
professions) would beneﬁt if the LLP were also provided under their domestic
law—unless they can already use the UK LLP itself. Following the structure
of the ﬁrst part,176 the next section will therefore examine whether there is
supply and demand for foreign partnership law in the EU and, if this is the
case, how law-makers may react to these conditions of competition.
C. Horizontal Competition: Choice between EU Member States
1. Supply
There are differences between the partnership laws of Member States.177
Therefore, if ﬁrms can freely choose between these laws, there is a supply of
partnership forms from different countries. In particular, it is worth con-
sidering whether ﬁrms from other Member States can choose the UK LLP.
From a UK perspective this would not pose any problems because the LLP
need not have any place of business in the UK (and, conversely, a foreign LLP
would only be determined by reference to the law of the place where it was
formed).178 However, it could be the case that the other Member State opposes
the evasion of its domestic law.179 Thus, the ﬁrst sub-section will analyse
Document, Progress by Member States in reviewing and eliminating restrictions to Competition
in the area of Professional Services of 5 September 2005, SEC(2005) 1064, paras 58–64.
173 This is based on the Second Company Law Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976
(as amended). 174 For instance in Germany according to BGHZ 90, 381.
175 See III.A.2, B.1 above.
176 See II.C above. 177 See III.A above.
178 See Whittaker and Machell (n 119) paras 17.1 and 17.12.
179 As it may be the case in Germany; see I Saenger, ‘Wegzug von Personengesellschaften’ in
Dieter Birk (ed), Transaktionen, Vermo¨gen, Pro Bono, Festschrift zum zehnja¨hrigen Bestehen von
P+P Po¨llath+Partners (Beck, Munich, 2008) 95, 300, 304 (real seat of a partnerships has to be
Germany). Note that the Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to
contractual obligations (‘Rome I’) excludes partnership law in art 1(2)(f).
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whether, according to European law, ﬁrms have the right to choose the part-
nership law of another Member State. The second sub-section will then ex-
amined which law is applicable to these LLPs, whether only UK law, or also
the law of the other Member State.
a) Freedom of establishment and partnerships
The case law of the European Court of Justice has led to a comprehensive
set of criteria as to how the freedom of establishment (EC Treaty, articles.
43, 48) affects the treatment of foreign companies in the EU. According to
the landmark decision in Centros a Member State has to recognize a com-
pany which is formed in accordance with the law of another Member State
even if this company has its actual centre of administration (‘real seat’) in
the former country. Although Member States can adopt appropriate mea-
sures for preventing or penalising fraud, it is not regarded as fraud that the
company wants to evade the minimum capital requirements of its home
country.180 U¨berseering conﬁrmed the relevance of the statutory seat instead
of the real seat. It was held that where a company is formed in accordance
with the law of a Member State in which it has its registered ofﬁce but then
moves its real seat to another Member State, the latter country must not deny
the company’s legal capacity.181 Inspire Art addressed the limits of these
principles. It was again emphasized that while Member States can prevent
fraud, this did not justify a law on pseudo-foreign companies which imposed
conditions relating to minimum capital and directors’ liability on a company
formed in accordance with the law of another Member State.182 Finally,
Sevic prohibits discrimination against cross-border mergers. If a Member
State allows a domestic merger of companies without liquidation of one
company and transfer of the whole of its assets to another company, it also
has to be possible for a foreign company to take part in these types of
mergers.183
In Cartesio the ECJ implicitly assumed that the freedom of establishment
was also applicable to a Hungarian limited partnership.184 However, it is not
180 Case C-212/97 Centros Lt. v Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen ECR [1999] I-1459.
181 Case C-208/00 U¨berseering BV v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH
ECR [2002] I-9919. However, the country in which the company was incorporated may impose
restrictions; Case 81/87 Daily Mail and General Trust [1988] ECR 5483 conﬁrmed in Case C-
210/06 Cartesio Oktato´ e´s Szolga´ltato´ bt, judgment of 16 December 2008.
182 Case C-167/01 Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd.
ECR [2003] I-10155.
183 Case C-411/03 SEVIC Systems AG [2005] ECR I-10805.
184 Case C-210/06 Cartesio Oktato´ e´s Szolga´ltato´ bt, judgment of 16 December 2008 (how-
ever, there was no violation of the Treaty since the case only concerned restrictions by the country
in which the partnership was established; see n 180).
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obvious that all partnerships enjoy the freedom of establishment. The decisive
question is how to interpret article 48(2), which states:
companies or ﬁrms [to which the freedom of establishment applies] means
companies or ﬁrms constituted under civil or commercial law, including coop-
erative societies, and other legal persons governed by public or private law, save
for those which are non-proﬁt-making.
The ﬁrst problem of this paragraph is how it relates to the laws of the Member
States. The reference to ‘civil or commercial law’ and ‘public or private law’
implies some dependence on the legal forms provided by the Member States.
However, this does not mean that it would be entirely for the Member States to
decide which entities are protected by the freedom of establishment, lest they
could undermine the full effectiveness (‘effet utile’) of the freedom of estab-
lishment. Thus a European interpretation of article 48(2) is needed.
For this interpretation the words ‘companies or ﬁrms’ appear to indicate a
very wide scope which would cover all partnerships. Similarly, the German
and French terms (‘Gesellschaften’, ‘socie´te´s’) refer to both companies and
partnerships. However, the words ‘other legal persons’ (as well as ‘sonstigen
juristischen Personen’ and ‘les autres personnes morales’) are puzzling, be-
cause in most countries not all partnerships are legal persons. Uniquely in
Scotland even ordinary partnerships are regarded as legal persons.185 In
France the same is the case for most partnerships except SEPs.186 The reverse
is true in England: in general, partnerships are not legal persons, however,
there is an exception for LLPs.187 Finally, the German situation is peculiar
because partnerships are never legal persons, however, most partnerships—
with the exception of ‘silent partnerships—have ‘legal capacity’.188
The easiest solution would be to understand the word ‘other’ as a mere
reference to the fact that there can be legal persons which are not companies or
partnerships, such as local public authorities.189 This would, however, go too
far. The purpose of article 48 is to extend article 43, which grants the freedom
of establishment to natural persons. Thus, for European citizens which es-
tablish a partnership article 43 and not article 48 is relevant if the partnership
itself cannot enter into contracts, own property, sue and be sued. Applying
article 48 to these partnerships would have the effect that, for instance, non-
EU citizens who establish a silent partnership under German or French law
could use this strategy in order to be protected by the freedom of establish-
ment of the Treaty. This is not the purpose of article 48. It is therefore
necessary to exclude partnerships which cannot do business in their own
185 Partnership Act 1890 s 4(2). 186 See III.A above.
187 Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000 s 1.
188 See III.A.1 above.
189 See eg German Civil Code (BGB) · 89; Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1996 ss 2,
3 (partnerships; companies) and ss 4, 5 (local authorities; other bodies corporate). Of course, these
entities may often be ‘non-proﬁt-making’ and therefore the freedom of establishment may not
protect them.
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name.190 Article 48 requires an entity that can enter into contracts, own
property, sue and be sued. As a result, the only partnerships from the three
countries discussed here which are not covered by article 48 are the French
SEPs and the German ‘silent partnerships’.
b) The applicable law
Since the UK LLP is protected by the freedom of establishment, it can be used
by ﬁrms from other Member States.191 Naturally, this will lead to the appli-
cability of UK LLP law and not the partnership (or company) law of the other
Member State. For instance, it would be a violation of the freedom of estab-
lishment if the other Member State imposed a minimum capital requirement
on foreign LLPs. It is, however, permissible (and likely) that LLPs need to
register foreign branches.192
A somewhat paradoxical result may occur for the relationship between the
LLP law on the one hand and the applicable tort and insolvency law on the
other. For LLPs who do business in the UK the limited liability under LLP law
is counterbalanced by a creditor-friendly tort and insolvency law. When courts
assume personal responsibility, this can lead to liability based on the tort of
negligence;193 and UK insolvency can lead to personal liability if there is
wrongful trading.194 However, according to private international law, an LLP
which is only doing business in another Member State has to comply with the
tort law of that Member State,195 and this law may often be less demanding.196
Similarly, at least according to some commentators, the applicable insolvency
law depends on the place of business, so that these LLPs could evade the
possibly stricter UK insolvency law.197 As a result, the members of such an
LLP are likely to enjoy an even greater protection against liability than a
UK-based LLP.
190 For a similar result see Al Randelzhofer and U Forsthoff in E Grabitz and M Hilf,
Kommentar zur Europa¨ischen Union (Beck, Munich, 2001) art 48 EG para 7.
191 By analogy to the case law of the ECJ for companies; see (n 179–n 182).
192 See M Henssler and H-P Mansel, ‘Die Limited Liability Partnership als Organisationsform
anwaltlicher Berufsausu¨bung’ (2007) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 1393, 1399.
193 See III.A.2 above.
194 Insolvency Act 1986 s 214 IA 1986. For applicability to the LLP see SR Cross, ‘Limited
Liability Partnerships Act 2000: Problems Ahead’ (2003) Journal of Business Law 268, 273.
195 See Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11
July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (‘Rome II’) art 4; Triebel and Silny
(n 170). For a different view see Henssler and Mansel (n 191) 1395-1387 (UK tort law applicable
via de´pac¸age).
196 That is the case in Germany and (presumably) in other civilian legal systems whose tort law
is based on the German Civil Code; for Germany see Siems (n 5) 73.
197 For the similar problem concerning the UK limited company see eg C Kersting and C
Philipp Schindler, ‘The ECJ’s Inspire Art Decision of 30 September 2003 and its Effects on
Practice’ (2003) 4 German Law Journal 1277, 1290; T Koller, ‘The English Limited Company—
Ready to Invade Germany’ (2004) 15 International Company and Commercial Law Review 334,
341 f.
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If a foreign law ﬁrm uses the LLP, the local professional law remains ap-
plicable.198 However, particular rules of professional law may also be cate-
gorized as belonging to partnership law. For instance, it would be a violation
of the freedom of establishment if the Member State of the real seat tried to
by-pass the liability protection of UK LLP law by imposing unlimited liability
under professional law.199 Similarly, it is not permissible to apply local pro-
fessional rules which are speciﬁcally designed for incorporated law ﬁrms. In
the German literature it has been suggested that the establishment of a
German-based LLP law ﬁrm requires approval from the local bar association,
by analogy with the rules on Lawyer-GmbHs.200 This alignment to the cor-
porate form would, however, undermine the nature of the LLP as a partner-
ship. In U¨berseering the ECJ held that a lawfully established company from
one Member State must also be regarded as a company—and not a partner-
ship—in other Member States.201 Likewise, the freedom of establishment re-
quires other Member States to accept the UK LLP as a partnership. Therefore,
professional rules which are speciﬁcally aimed at companies are not appli-
cable.
The tax treatment of foreign LLPs can be complex, in particular if an LLP
has branches in several Member States. The crucial starting point is whether
the LLP is classiﬁed as a company or as a partnership under tax law. In
contrast to the historical distinction used in commercial law, tax law typically
relies upon a number of criteria in order to determine which legal rules are
applicable. After some legal uncertainty the German tax authorities now take
the view that the LLP is subject to partnership taxation.202 If other Member
States came to a different result, LLPs which operate across borders may have
the problem that they are subject to different tax regimes in different coun-
tries.203 Finally, tax treaties may be relevant in facilitating (or complicating)
the taxation of LLPs whose main place of business is outside the UK.204
c) Result
In the EU, ﬁrms from all Member States can already choose the legal form of
the LLP. Freedom of establishment also guarantees that the members of such
198 See eg B Grunewald and H Mu¨ller, ‘Ausla¨ndische Rechtsberatungsgesellschaften in
Deutschland’ (2005) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 465, 466.
199 This is discussed, but rejected, in Germany; see Siems (n 5) 73.
200 M P Weller and F Kienle, ‘Die Anwalts-LLP in Deutschland—Anerkennung—
Postulationsfa¨higkeit—Haftung (Teil II)’ [2005] Deutsches Steuerrecht (DStR) 1102, 1104.
201 Case C-208/00 U¨berseering BV v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH
ECR [2002] I-9919.
202 SenFin Berlin of 19 January 2007, Internationales SteuerRecht (IStR) 2007 447–448.
203 See P Essers and Gerad TK Meussen, ‘Taxation of Partnerships/Hybrid Entities’ in
McCahery et al (n 89) 415.
204 For a list of double-taxation treaties between the UK and other countries see http://
www.icaew.com/index.cfm?route=154613.
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an LLP enjoy liability protection, which may even surpass the protection of
members of UK-based LLPs. Some complications may arise due to the in-
terplay between LLP law and professional law and domestic and foreign tax
law. This legal uncertainty may be one reason why few ﬁrms from continental
Europe have chosen to establish an LLP instead of a domestic legal entity.
However, there may be other considerations which inﬂuence the demand for
‘going foreign’ in partnership law.
2. Demand
Private companies from continental Europe increasingly incorporate in the
UK. Becht et al empirically examined this development. The Table 8 presents
their data for selected Member States from different parts of Europe.
They show that since the 1999 decision of the ECJ in Centros206 the average
number of incorporations increased from 146 to 671 ﬁrms per year. They also
provide evidence of what drives foreign incorporations: using differences-in-
differences regressions they ﬁnd that legal migration rates are explained by
country-speciﬁc incorporation costs and minimum capital requirements.207
This explains, for instance, why more German than French ﬁrms have incor-
porated limited companies in the UK.
There is no meaningful hard data available on how many LLPs operate in
continental Europe. The German commercial register shows only three en-
tries,208 but it is likely that a number of LLPs do business Germany without
having registered a branch. Generally, of course, one can assume that only few
LLPs have been established in continental Europe. This leads to the question
Table 8. Number of newly incorporated UK limited companies where the majority
of directors reside in another country205
‘Directors’
Residence 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Denmark 133 135 178 163 299 1,131 1,484 239 288 280
France 1,112 1,396 1,491 1,408 1,214 1,298 1,411 1,477 1,759 1,670
Germany 600 633 776 807 717 1,164 2752 10,263 13,728 16,438
Italy 440 442 538 422 329 370 428 431 553 748
Netherl. 501 506 583 467 521 637 732 1,571 2,193 2,156
Poland 31 29 41 20 24 34 301 116 140 154
205 Source: Becht et al (n 3) 248.
206 See III C 1 a above.
207 Becht et al (n 3) 249. The differences-in-differences technique measures whether legal
changes in one country (but not the other ones) have had an impact on corporation decisions.
208 Search at http://www.handelsregister.de/rp_web/search.do.
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whether development similar to that for limited companies can be expected in
the future.
Becht et al have shown that the clariﬁcation of the law by the ECJ was of
crucial importance for the use of the limited company. Therefore, one would
expect that when (or if) the ECJ clariﬁes the law of foreign LLPs, this will also
encourage their use. This may then have a self-enhancing effect because the
more foreign LLPs are established, the more often courts will be forced to deal
with them, which will then provide clariﬁcation of the law, in turn leading to
more LLPs.
Similar to the situation for limited companies it is likely that differences
between countries matter. On the one hand, the LLP may have different ben-
eﬁts for ﬁrms from different Member States. For instance, in Germany there is
already the PartG, which provides a partnership with some limited liability for
all partners.209 Thus, for German ﬁrms the LLP would ‘just’ mean some
‘upgrading’ of the PartG form. Conversely, French law does not provide a
general protection against liability for partnerships. However, French com-
pany law is more business friendly than German company law,210 thus it is
difﬁcult to assess which legal system may drive more ﬁrms into the UK LLP.
On the other hand, non-economic reasons may also play a role. Speculating, it
could be the case that for cultural reasons German and Dutch ﬁrms are more
willing to establish a UK company or partnership than their French, Italian and
Polish counterparts.
The development of pseudo-foreign limited companies also shows the
important role of registration agents and legal advisors. A number of websites
offer cheap and quick registration of limited companies, in particular for ﬁrms
from Germany, Austria and the Netherlands.211 Some of these websites also
offer the cheap and quick establishment of a UK LLP,212 thus indicating that
there appears to be at least some demand for the LLP. Furthermore, conti-
nental lawyers with expertise in UK law can reduce the costs of establishing
and running a UK legal entity. There are already approximately 45 books on
the UK limited company written by German lawyers.213 In the last two years
the ﬁrst two books on the LLP were published in German214 and there are also
a number of articles on the LLP in German law journals.215 Thus, at least in
209 See III A 2 above. 210 See III B 1 above.
211 Becht et al (n 3) 242, 245, 255.
212 For instance, http://www.formationshouse.com, http://www.companyregistrations.co.uk
and http://www.ukincorp.co.uk offer their services in German, French and other European lan-
guages. Other websites who offer the establishment of an LLP appear mainly oriented towards the
UK market; see http://www.yorkplace.co.uk; http://www.sdgonline.com; http://www.start.biz;
http://www.chalfen.com.
213 Search in http://www.amazon.de (Fachbu¨cher).
214 H Schnittker und S Bank, Die LLP in der Praxis: Gesellschaftsrecht und Steuerrecht der
Limited Liability Partnership (Beck Munich 2007); Schnittker (n 5).
215 References in Siems (n 5); Triebel and Silny (n 170).
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Germany, there may be the potential that lawyers will also be intermediaries
for the LLP.
In the UK the LLP is a very popular legal form for medium and large law
ﬁrms. Thus, it may promote the use of the LLP elsewhere that the market for
legal advice has changed considerably in the last few years.216 Whereas pre-
viously small local law ﬁrms had dominated the market, an increase in com-
petition and a number of mergers have led to a growing number of lawyers per
ﬁrm. In these bigger law ﬁrms a partner can hardly observe how the other
partners advise their clients. Thus, there is a growing need for liability pro-
tection by choosing an entity such as the LLP.
Overall there are therefore a number of reasons why it can be expected that
ﬁrms from continental Europe will demand the UK LLP. This leads to the
question how law-makers would react to this development, in particular
whether they would start competing in partnership law.
3. Reaction of law-makers
Many Member States have modernized their law on limited liability com-
panies in the last few years. In 2003 the reform of the French SARL reduced
the minimum capital to E1217 and in Spain a new ﬂexible form of limited
liability company (‘Sociedad Limitada Nueva Empresa’ or SLNE) was in-
troduced.218 The UK Companies Act 2006 led to a simpliﬁcation of the law
applicable to limited companies.219 In 2007, Estonian company law was made
more business friendly.220 In 2008 the German law was reformed by in-
troducing a new type of entity, which does not require minimum capital at the
moment of incorporation.221 There are also plans to modernize the law on
limited liability companies in the Netherlands and in other countries.222
Can a similar dynamic be expected for LLP law? The history of the LLP
indicates that lawmakers take the experiences of other jurisdictions into ac-
count and are keen on modernizing their law. The development in the US has
already been mentioned.223 In Europe, the LLP was ﬁrst introduced in Jersey
216 See eg B E Aronson, ‘Elite Law Firm Mergers and Reputational Competition: Is Bigger
Really Better?’ (2007) 40 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 763.
217 Loi no 2003-721 du 1er aouˆt 2003 pour l’initiative e´conomique.
218 Ley 7/2003, de 1 de abril, de la sociedad limitada Nueva Empresa.
219 See the summary of key beneﬁts at http://www.berr.gov.uk/bbf/co-act-2006/
Major%20Beneﬁts%20to%20Business/page35194.html.
220 See JJA Burke, ‘Corporate Governance in Estonia: Intact despite 2007 amendment to
Commercial Code’ Baltic Rim Economies Review 4/2007, Expert Article 129.
221 Gesetz zur Modernisierung des GmbH-Rechts und zur Beka¨mpfung von Missbra¨uchen
(MoMiG), as approved by the German parliament on 26 June 2008.
222 BH and L Lennarts, ‘The Reform of Dutch Private Company Law: New Rules for the
Protection of Creditors’ (2007) 8 European Business Organization Law Review 567; J A
McCahery, E D G Kiersch and L Timmerman, Private Company Law Reform: International &
European Perspectives (CUP, Cambridge, 2007). 223 See II.A above.
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in 1997.224 Then, the UK legislator feared that law and accounting ﬁrms
would emigrate to Jersey and so it enacted the Limited Liability Partnership
Act 2001.225 Japan and Singapore introduced the legal form of the LLP in
2005 and 2006226 and India followed suit in 2008.227 Jersey modiﬁed its law
in 2009 ‘in the light of international developments so as to ensure that Jersey
has a competitive LLP offering’.228
There is cause to expect that in continental Europe law-makers may feel
induced to follow the path of the UK. The alternative strategy—trying to stop
domestic ﬁrms establishing a UK LLP—is hardly feasible due to freedom of
establishment.229 Germany has already introduced the PartG—an ‘LLP
light’—in 1994 and strengthened the liability protection in 1998.230
Moreover, the reforms of the law on the limited company in many Member
States show that law-markers in other countries are also responding to busi-
ness interests, even if this means reducing the (direct) protection of creditors.
The history of the current LLP laws also suggests that interested parties and
networks are a main driving force behind these new laws. In the US, lawyers
played a key role.231 With respect to Jersey’s LLP law it is reported that in the
mid 1990s two members of the big accounting ﬁrms approached the Jersey
authorities with a proposal for an LLP and offered assistance with parlia-
mentary drafting.232 And for the UK it has been complained that the ‘LLP
resulted entirely from political pressure from professional ﬁrms for limited
liability in respect to their activities and from their unwillingness to incor-
porate’.233 Still, there may also be opposing forces in other Member States.
McCahery et al speculate that the civil law notaries would frustrate attempts to
provide a UK-style LLP because the availability of limited liability without a
notarial deed would lead to a drop in their revenues.234 However, this is not
really plausible because ﬁrms from all Member States can choose the UK LLP
in any event. Moreover, lawyers and other professionals who may establish an
LLP in the future are often partnerships under civil law235—and these part-
nerships also do not require a notarial deed.
A more substantive opposition may submit that the LLP is a product of a
‘race to the bottom’. In company law some believe that there can be a ‘race to
the top’, because, as with other forms of competition, here too the market’s
224 See P Morris and J Stevenson, ‘The Jersey Limited Liability Partnership: A New Legal
Vehicle for Professional Practice’ (1997) 60 MLR 538; J Payne, ‘Limiting the Liability of
Professional Partnerships: In Search of this Holy Grail’ (1997) 18 Company Lawyer 81, 85–87.
225 See Cross (n 193) 270; McCahery et al (n 167) 35.
226 See McCahery et al (n 167).
227 RDER See http://www.pib.nic.in/release/rel_print_page1.asp?relid=51749.
228 See Consultation paper, available at http://www.gov.je/StatesGreffe/MinisterialDecision/
EconomicDevelopment/2008/mde20080050.htm. This led to the Limited Partnerships
(Amendment) (Jersey) Law 2009 L.6/2009.
229 See III.C.1. a above. 230 See III.A.1. above.
231 See II.A. C.3 above. 232 Morris and Stevenson (n 222) 542.
233 Freedman (n 126) 898. 234 McCahery et al (n 167) 33.
235 See III.A.1 above.
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invisible hand leads to an optimal pattern for corporate governance.236 By
contrast the counter-view stresses that there is a ‘race of laxity’237 or ‘race to
the bottom’,238 since the law is deregulated at the expense of other groups,
such as the shareholders, creditors or employees. In the context of LLPs the
interests of members and employees are unlikely to be affected. The principle-
agent problem between directors and shareholders/members is speciﬁc for
public companies because the owners do not manage the day to day business
of the ﬁrm. Employee interests matter for companies if a jurisdiction provides
employee co-determination or works councils. Again, this is not relevant for
the LLP.
With respect to creditor interests one could argue that limited liability for
partnerships means that creditors lose protection. However, it is unclear how
creditors are best protected. Regarding the limited liability company, it is
controversially discussed whether the minimum capital requirement is really
useful.239 As for partnerships one may question whether the personal liability
of natural persons is really valuable if substantial damages have been caused.
Moreover, the LLP provides more indirect creditor protection than ordinary
partnerships due to stricter registration, accounting and disclosure require-
ments. As a result, it may even be the case that creditors would prefer it if
medium-size partnerships become more professional by transforming into an
LLP.
D. Conclusion
Regulatory competition in partnership law is likely to develop in Europe. The
starting point for this development is the UK LLP, which—due to freedom of
establishment—can also be used in other Member States. To be sure, other
Member States also address the needs of ﬁrms to provide some protection
against liability. For instance, in Germany and France there are special legal
forms aimed at the protection of lawyers against malpractice of their partners.
However, the LLP has a special appeal because it combines the ﬂexibility and
taxation of a partnership with full liability protection under partnership law.
Future research could examine comparative partnership law of European
countries in more detail. It would be interesting to ﬁnd out whether (as it was
implicitly assumed in this article) UK, French and German law have been the
main legislative models for other European countries. Moreover, there is a
236 See in particular Romano (n 1) 14 f.
237 Justice Brandeis in Liggett v Lee, 288 US 517, 559.
238 W.L Cary, ‘Federalism and Corporate Law: Reﬂections upon Delaware’ (1994) 83 Yale
Law Journal 663. For further references see (n 1).
239 See eg J Armour, ‘Legal Capital: an Outdated Concept’ (2006) 7 European Business
Organization Law Review 5; E Ferran, ‘The Place for Creditor Protection on the Agenda for
Modernisation of Company Law in the European Union’ [2006] European Company and
Financial Law Review 178.
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need for contextualized comparisons. This article has presented some em-
pirical data. However, it has also become apparent that more comprehensive
data on all Member States would be needed in order to conduct a full-ﬂedged
quantitative comparative analysis.
IV. SUMMARY
Regulatory competition in company law has been extensively debated in the
last few decades, but it has rarely been discussed whether there could also be
regulatory competition in partnership law. This article has ﬁlled this gap. It
has addressed the partnership law of the US, the UK, Germany and France,
and has presented empirical data on the different types of partnerships and
companies established in these jurisdictions.
The ﬁrst part found that in the US there is both vertical and horizontal
competition in partnership law. In most states, businesses and professionals
can freely choose between a number of entity forms, such as LLPs, LLCs and
different types of corporations. Moreover, states themselves care about the
attractiveness of their partnership law. This is most noticeable for Delaware’s
law on limited partnerships but one can also identify some regulatory com-
petition for the ‘best’ LLP law.
The second main part has turned to the situation in the European Union.
Here the legal landscape is more diverse because only UK law knows the LLP,
whereas in Germany and France there are other forms of partnership and
company law which, for instance, may be used by law ﬁrms (eg PartG,
Anwalts-GmbH, SCP, SEP, SELARL). However, these legal forms can only
provide a partial substitute for the UK LLP. Since the freedom of establish-
ment of the EC Treaty allows continental ﬁrms to choose the UK LLP, it is
therefore likely that regulatory competition will also develop in partnership
law in the EU.
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